
More than 100 chemical weapons sites are suspected to remain in Syria, according to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). This estimate marks the first of its kind as the OPCW aims to assess remnants of the military program operated by former president Bashar al-Assad.
The identified sites are believed to have been involved in the research, manufacturing, and storage of chemical weapons, which were used by al-Assad against both rebel fighters and civilians during the protracted civil war.
The OPCW's estimate significantly exceeds any numbers previously acknowledged by al-Assad's regime. The sites represent a major challenge for the current caretaker government, led by the group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States but claims to have severed ties with Al Qaeda.
Experts express concern over the potential for militant groups to access poorly secured chemical weapons facilities, as the dangers posed by these weapons can be catastrophic, especially in densely populated areas. Chemical agents like sarin can be lethal within minutes, while chlorine and mustard gas can cause severe harm to victims.
In March, during a visit to the OPCW headquarters in The Hague, Syria's foreign minister claimed that the government would destroy any remnants of the chemical weapons program and comply with international law. Although experts cautiously hope for sincerity in this commitment, the new government has yet to appoint an ambassador to the OPCW—an indicator of a country's commitment to international agreements.
In the civil war's early years, al-Assad’s government declared 27 sites to the OPCW, leading to their inspection and closure. However, the regime continued to use chemical weapons until at least 2018 while reportedly importing precursor chemicals necessary for their production.
The current estimate of over 100 sites, circulated among experts and analysts, was derived from a combination of external research, nonprofit input, and intelligence shared by member states. Some sites are likely hidden in inaccessible locations, complicating efforts to secure them.
Raed al-Saleh, leader of the Syria Civil Defense (White Helmets), emphasized that many locations remain unknown due to the previous regime’s deception regarding its chemical weapons capabilities. Nidal Shikhani, who leads the Chemical Violations Documentation Center of Syria, noted that his organization has identified additional potential chemical weapons sites based on interviews with former Syrian government scientists.
Identifying and securing these sites is crucial for both security and the collection of evidence related to al-Assad's use of chemical weapons. Various international observers and researchers have documented numerous attacks, including the notorious 2013 sarin gas attack in Ghouta, a suburb of Damascus.
Last year, Israel conducted airstrikes on facilities associated with chemical weapons, but it remains uncertain whether these strikes effectively destroyed any weapons. Concerns have been voiced that such attacks may have caused environmental damage and obscured evidence of the Assad government's actions.
International law categorically prohibits sarin gas, while regulation of other chemicals like chlorine gas is complicated due to their common household applications. Syria’s chemical weapons program, which began in the 1970s with extensive support from trained scientists, continues to pose significant challenges as many of these individuals have fled the country, while others remain.
Despite assurances from the new government regarding the dismantling of chemical weapons, inspectors remain skeptical, having previously received similar promises that were not fulfilled. The Assad regime’s history of obfuscation during inspections has led to cautious optimism among international watchdogs.
As evidence of chemical attacks accumulated over the years, local officials recounted the impact of such events in towns like Zamalka, where mass graves of victims from a 2013 suspected chemical weapons attack exist, only to be covered up by al-Assad’s government after retaking the area in 2017.